Abstract
Introduction
Message authentication protocols can be used to authenticate the sources, integrity and unforgeability of the transmitted messages. In the classical message authentication protocols based on mathematical complexity assumptions, digital signature schemes [1, 2] and message authentication codes (MACs) are usually used [3] . However, with the development of quantum computing technology, the security of the classical message authentication protocols based on the unproven mathematical assumptions are faced with a great challenge.
Quantum cryptosystems [4, 5] take advantage of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, according to which measuring a quantum system in general disturbs it and yields incomplete information about its state before the measurement. This makes that the eavesdropper who tries to eavesdrop the information in the quantum channel can be detected. This advantage makes that quantum cryptography can be used to distribute secret key so that the key has the property of perfect secrecy. Now, although quantum cryptography is best known for its applications in key distribution protocols [6, 7] , quantum techniques can also assist in the achievement of quantum authentication protocols [8, 9, [10] [11] [12] . In this paper, we mainly focus on the study of quantum authentication protocols.
In the quantum authentication protocols, the authenticated messages are encrypted by using quantum encrypting algorithm, so these protocols have the properties of both secrecy and authentication for the transmitted messages. To our knowledge, most of the quantum authentication protocols so far were used to authenticate quantum messages. However, in the communication world, classical messages are widely used. So, it is necessary to study the quantum authentication of classical messages. The quantum authentication protocols of classical messages can be more secure than the classical authentication protocols, because the security of the former is based on fundamental properties of quantum mechanics instead of on unproven mathematical assumptions.
The early quantum authentication protocols of classical messages were proposed by Curty et al. [8, 9] . In these protocols, the message sender and corresponding receiver shared two-qubit maximally entangled states as their authentication key. To authenticate one bit of classical message, the message sender sent the entangled qubits to the message receiver.
In this paper, a new quantum authentication protocol of classical messages is proposed. Our protocol is different from the early ones. That is, in our protocol, the hash function is introduced to reduce the successful probability of various kinds of known attacks such as no-message attack and message attack. In our protocol, the message sender and message receiver share a sequence of Bell states as their authentication key. To send a classical message, the message sender performs some unitary operations on his/her own particles and sends the results to the message receiver. One transmitted particle can carry two bits of classical messages. The message receiver decodes the classical message and its corresponding hash value from the received sequence of particles. By checking the hash value of the decoded classical message, the message receiver can verify the validity of the transmitted classical message. Any forgery or measurement on the transmitted particles will be detected by the valid message receiver.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we propose our new quantum authentication protocol of classical messages. In section 3, we analyze the security of the proposed protocol against various attacks.
New Construction of Quantum Authentication of Classical Messages
In our protocol, four Bell states as follows
n be a secure public cryptographic hash function, where n is a positive number. On the other hand, in our protocol, four unitary operations
Assume Alice wants to send a certified classical message to Bob. The goal is to make Bob confident about the authenticity of the message and sender. In our protocol, a quantum channel is used to transmit quantum messages. So, it is necessary to encode the classical message into a sequence of particles. On the other hand, to verify the quantum messages sent from Alice and decode the corresponding classical message, a quantum decoding algorithm should be performed by Bob. All the encoding and decoding algorithms can be public. In our protocol, four different unitary operations, U 0 , U 1 , U 2 and U 3 , are performed on the qubits owned by Alice so as to encode the classical message into a sequence of Bell states.
Assume the message to be authenticated is a bit string m=m 1 m 2 …m i …m t , where m i is a two-bit message. This is, m i ∈{00, 01, 10, 11} for i=1, 2, …, t. We will assume that Alice and Bob share a sequence of two-qubit maximally entangled states |s 1 >, |s 2 
Figure 1. An Example of Alice's Encoding Process
Once receiving the particles {P' A,1 , P' A,2 , …,P' A,t , P' A,t+1 , …,P' A,t+n } from Alice, Bob makes the Bell-basis measurements on the sequence of pairs {( P' A,1, P B,1 ), (P' A,2 , P B,2 ), …, (P' A,t , P B,t ), (P' A,t+1 , P B,t+1 ), …, (P' A,t+n , P B,t+n )}. Then, Bob can decode the classical message m and its hash value h from the results of the measurements on { ( P' A,1, P 
Security Analysis
From our protocol, it is found that the each qubit sent from Alice carries two bits of binary message. Bob extracts the classical message m and its corresponding hash value from the results of quantum measurements by performing Bell-basis measurements. Because Alice and Bob share the sequence of Bell states, {(P A,1 , P B,1 ), (P A,2 , P B,2 ), …, (P A,t , P B,t ), (P A,t+1 , P B,t+1 ), …,(P A,t+n , P B,t+n )}, the message m and its hash value h(m) can always be decoded and verified. The message m will pass the verification in case that no forgery or tampering with the sent message occurs. That is, if a forgery or tampered message can pass the verification of Bob, our protocol would fail.
In this section, we analyze the security of our protocol under two kinds of attacks: nomessage attack and message attacks.
The no-message attack is that, before Alice's sending any message to Bob, Eve attempts to prepare a sequence of qubits that passes the decoding algorithm.
For the message attacks, we assume that Eve can access the qubits transmitted in the quantum channel, and she tries to manipulate the quantum message sent from Alice and produces a forged message. In this kind of attack, Eve also attempts to obtain the authentication key by performing some measurements on the quantum message sent from Alice.
No-message Attack
Assume Eve prepares a sequence of pure qubits {|a 1 >, |a 2 >, …, |a t >, |a t+1 >, …, |a t+n >} and sends it to Bob. Her goal is to make the sequence pass the verification of Bob so as to make Bob believe that the classical message carried by this sequence comes from Alice. When Bob receives this sequence, he cannot know that it comes from a forger, so he performs the Bell-basis measurements on the qubits owned by himself.
For example, assume |a 1 >=e|0>+f|1>, which comes from Eve. When Bob receives |a 1 >, the global state of (P A,1 , |a 1 
When Bob performs the Bell-basis measurement on the particles |a 1 > and P B,1 , he will get
with the probability 1/4 , respectively. That is, when Bob receives the forged sequence {|a 1 >, |a 2 >, …, |a t >, |a t+1 >, …, |a t+n >}, he will perform the Bell-basis measurements on the sequence {(|a 1 n . Then, the successful probability of forgery under no-message attack of Bob is as little as 1/2 n .
Message Attacks
There are two kinds of message attacks. In the first kind of attack called TPCP map, instead of directly forging quantum messages and sending them to Bob, Eve will wait for Alice's original messages and try to manipulate them. Note that for each Bell state, Eve can only have the access to the particle transmitted from Alice. Although Eve does not know what classical message is transmitted, she attempts to convert the authentic message into another one so as to pass the verification of Bob. So, for our protocol, Eve performs a unitary operation on the particles from Alice and sends the results to Bob. Eve tries to convert each Bell state into another one so that the tampered Bell state can pass the verification of Bob. Then, based on the knowledge of all the public aspects of the quantum authentication scheme used, Eve determines one operation and applies it to the particles sent from Alice. In the second kind of attack, called measurement attack, Eve tries to extract the information of the authentication key by performing some measurements on the transmitted message in the quantum channel. This kind of attack is more dangerous. If Eve can extract the information of authentication key from the results of the measurements, she may arbitrarily prepare the forged messages, which can pass the verification of Bob. 
